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September 2010
How Scary Is Stop the Beach Renourishment?
Roger Bernhardt
Introduction
As a matter of strict water law, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v Florida Dep’t of Envt’l Protection (2010) ___ US ___, 177 L Ed 2d 184,
130 S Ct 2592 (reported at p 142), is not exceptionally interesting, because the general rules have
been that the states hold in trust all of the submerged land below navigable waters, and that the
doctrine of avulsion (sudden boundary changes from water actions) does not have the same
impact on property boundaries that the slower boundary changes resulting from accretion or
reliction do. See City of Long Beach v Mansell (1970) 3 C3d 462, 476 P2d 423. Consequently, as
a substantive takings law issue, loss of what had never been held to be an established property
right (direct contact of littoral land with the water) simply meant that no constitutional
deprivation had occurred, in Florida or, likely, in California.
Analysis
But the notion that a judicial decision could, under the right circumstances, by itself constitute
a taking of a litigant’s property can be unsettling. Just as city planners some years ago had to
learn to consider the impact of their decisions on local budgets in light of judicial development of
the doctrine of regulatory takings, so now perhaps local judges may also have to check with their
municipal treasurers before they too readily decide to alter settled property rights. Four members
of the United States Supreme Court have now held that this could happen. Justice Scalia, joined
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, has announced: “If a legislature or a
court declares that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has
taken that property, no less than if the State had physically appropriated it or destroyed its value
by regulation.” 177 L Ed 2d at 197; emphasis in original.
That means that a judicial rule change that eliminates what had previously been regarded as a
property right of one of the parties could constitute a taking. The growth of the common law by
the technique of changing the rules could be costly. “It is no more essential that judges be free to
overrule prior cases that establish property entitlements than that state legislators be free to revise
pre-existing statutes that confer property entitlements, or agency-heads pre-existing regulations
that do so.” 177 L Ed 2d at 204. Precedent may have some kind of economic value. “What
counts is not whether there is precedent for the allegedly confiscatory decision, but whether the
property right allegedly taken was established.” 177 L Ed 2d at 201. The risk exists, even when
the old precedent was in known jeopardy. A “judicial elimination of established private-property
rights that is foreshadowed by dicta or even by holdings years in advance is nonetheless a
taking.” 177 L Ed 2d at 205.
The fact that these quoted parts of the opinion had only four signatures is not that soothing,
since none of the other four Justices held positions that were truly contradictory. Justices
Kennedy and Sotomayor simply thought that due process analysis was preferable to takings

analysis (i.e., asking whether the ruling was arbitrary or irrational), which could still leave
compensation as a possible remedy for a violation. They said (177 L Ed 2d at 212):
And if the litigation were a class action to decide, for instance, whether there are public rights of
access that diminish the rights of private ownership, a State might find itself obligated to pay a
substantial judgment for the judicial ruling. Even if the legislature were to subsequently rescind
the judicial decision by statute, the State would still have to pay just compensation for the
temporary taking that occurred from the time of the judicial decision to the time of the statutory
fix.
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, on the other hand, merely believed that “the questions were
better left for another day,” which does not say that much about the possible outcome when that
day arrives. With Justice Kagan now replacing absent Justice Stevens, the future of this doctrine
is even more unpredictable.
In light of the fact that judicial decisions might someday be regarded as compensable takings,
and since there was nothing in the opinion about retroactivity, I have indulged my imagination,
and offer the following existing decisions of the California Supreme Court as candidates under
such a new doctrine. The first three more or less frankly acknowledged that the rules were being
changed. The last two retilted the playing field no less dramatically, although they were not quite
as explicit about admitting it (which perhaps may become important if the Stop the Beach
doctrine truly starts inhibiting rule remaking).
Slumlords and the Implied Warranty
In Green v Superior Court (1974) 10 C3d 616, 111 CR 704, Justice Tobriner began (10 C3d at
619):
Under traditional common law doctrine, long followed in California, a landlord was under no
duty to maintain leased dwellings in habitable condition during the term of the lease. In the past
several years, however, the highest courts of a rapidly growing number of states ... have
reexamined the bases of the old common law rule and have uniformly determined that it no
longer corresponds to the realities of the modern urban landlord-tenant relationship.
Accordingly, each of these jurisdictions has discarded the old common law rule and has adopted
an implied warranty of habitability for residential leases.... [W]e have determined that [there is] a
common law implied warranty of habitability in residential leases in California, and we conclude
that the breach of such warranty may be raised as a defense in an unlawful detainer action.
The court forthrightly admitted that it was putting a new rule into place; but it was time to do
so (10 C3d at 622):
The transformation of the landlord-tenant relationship and developments in analogous areas of
law compel the recognition of a common law implied warranty of habitability in residential
leases in California.... Under the implied warranty which we recognize, a residential landlord
covenants that premises he leases for living quarters will be maintained in a habitable state for
the duration of the lease.... [W]e do not exercise a novel prerogative, but merely follow the wellestablished duty of common law courts to reflect contemporary social values and ethics.
But because this decision dramatically removed the former freedom that some landlords had
of not spending money on the upkeep of their rental units, was that a taking of their properties?
Did the fact that courts in other jurisdictions were reaching the same result make our court’s
decision less of a taking? Or did the fact that rent control ordinances more or less simultaneously

survived takings attacks (see Pennel v City of San Jose (1988) 485 US 1, 99 L Ed 2d 1, 108 S Ct
849) mean that implied warranty decisions were equally immune? Should this sudden wealth
transfer from landlords to tenants have been treated as a compensable taking?
Impenetrable Running Covenants and Incomprehensible Servitudes
Students dread the topic of covenants running with the land because of its complexity.
Apparently, our supreme court believed that to be a sufficient reason for eliminating one of its
more arcane rules. With regard to these interests, the supreme court noted, in Citizens for
Covenant Compliance v Anderson (1995) 12 C4th 345, 47 CR2d 898, that “the Court of Appeal
held they are not enforceable because they were not also mentioned in a deed or other document
when the property was sold.” But then it said (12 C4th at 349):
We disagree, and adopt the following rule: If a declaration establishing a common plan for the
ownership of property in a subdivision and containing restrictions upon the use of the property as
part of the common plan, is recorded before the execution of the contract of sale, describes the
property it is to govern, and states that it is to bind all purchasers and their successors,
subsequent purchasers who have constructive notice of the recorded declaration are deemed to
intend and agree to be bound by, and to accept the benefits of, the common plan; the restrictions,
therefore, are not unenforceable merely because they are not additionally cited in a deed or other
document at the time of the sale. [Emphasis in original.]
That was not what the court had said earlier. In Werner v Graham (1919) 181 C 174, 182, 183
P 945, it had held:
Servitudes running with the land in favor of one parcel and against another cannot be created in
any such uncertain and indefinite fashion.... The grantee’s intent in this respect is necessary, as
well as the grantor’s, and the deed, which constitutes the final and exclusive memorial of their
joint intent, has not a word to that effect, nor anything whatever which can be seized upon and
given construction as an expression of such intent ... as of the time it is given.... Nor does it make
any difference that ... [the developer] gave each grantee to understand, and each grantee did
understand, that the restrictions were exacted as part of a general scheme. Any understanding not
incorporated in them is wholly immaterial in the absence of a reformation.
This was reaffirmed in Riley v Bear Creek Planning Comm. (1976) 17 C3d 500, 131 CR 381,
which, as the Citizens for Covenant Compliance court observed (12 C4th at 348):
rejected the claim that parol evidence may be admitted to show that the parties in fact intended
the property to be subject to restrictions like those later recorded, finding that the covenants must
be in writing to be effective. The rule of the Werner case is supported by every consideration of
sound public policy which has led to the enactment and enforcement of statutes of frauds in
every English-speaking commonwealth.
That rule may not have made great policy sense, but it was surely the rule; as the Citizens for
Covenant Compliance court acknowledged (12 C4th at 360): “[T]o date, the Court of Appeal
decisions have required some reference in the deed, however vague, to the recorded restrictions.”
The impact of this change—abandoning the requirement of having at least one deed in the
development refer to the recorded CC&Rs—was dramatically noted by dissenting Justice
Kennard in Citizens for Covenant Compliance (12 C4th at 369):

By adopting this rule, the majority blasts a gaping hole through the structure of real property law
that has been painstakingly erected by the Legislature and by the courts over the past century....
[T]he majority has now transformed grant deeds that on their face are unrestricted conveyances
of the landowner’s entire interest into deeds conveying only a portion of the landowner’s
interest.... Because Californians have been creating subdivisions for at least 130 years, the
majority’s decision to make its new rule retroactive will revive land use restrictions that, like the
restrictions in this case, were unenforceable under the law as it existed before today, while at the
same time erasing other land use restrictions on which landowners may have relied for
generations.
If your client was a landowner/developer whose prospective title, in your opinion, had been
clean despite old CC&Rs in the chain of title because no deed had ever incorporated them, would
you now recommend that your client consider suing the judge if she declared that the title was
restricted anyway, because she had taken one of his property rights away?
Natural Servitudes and Common Enemies
California follows the civil law (known as the natural servitude doctrine) regarding the
disposition of surface waters, a rule that restricts the ability of an upper landowner to use
artificial means to dispose of unwanted surface waters over her downhill neighbor’s property.
But then, as stated in Ektelon v City of San Diego (1988) 200 CA3d 804, 808, 246 CR 483:
Keys v. Romley [(1966) 64 C2d 396, 409, 50 CR 273], modified the rule, however, by inserting
a requirement of reasonableness, holding that: “No party, whether an upper or a lower
landowner, may act arbitrarily and unreasonably in his relations with other landowners and still
be immunized from all liability.... It is therefore incumbent upon every person to take reasonable
care in using his property to avoid injury to adjacent property through the flow of surface waters.
Failure to exercise reasonable care may result in liability by an upper to a lower landowner. It is
equally the duty of any person threatened with injury to his property by the flow of surface
waters to take reasonable precautions to avoid or reduce any actual or potential injury. If the
actions of both the upper and lower landowners are reasonable, necessary, and generally in
accord with the foregoing, then the injury must necessarily be borne by the upper landowner who
changes a natural system of drainage, in accordance with our traditional civil law rule.
That means that the old rights a downhill property owner had to arbitrarily demand that his
uphill neighbor not use artificial techniques to divert her unwanted surface waters over his
property vanished in 1966, when Keys was decided. The downhill owner’s claim was lost unless
he could also show that he himself had taken reasonable precautions to reduce his injuries.
If a court told a property owner that his former absolute right to tell trespassers to keep off his
property was being replaced with a limitation of reasonableness, i.e., that he now had to show
that he was unreasonably bothered or harmed by their trespasses, would that amount to a taking
of one of his property rights? Will the Fifth Amendment stop courts from displacing the
principles of absolutism now in property law with principles of reasonableness derived from
modern tort law?
Beach Access by the Public and Good Samaritan Owners
These next two decisions wrought comparably large changes in California law, but because
our supreme court appeared less willing to acknowledge what it had done, I have put them at the
bottom of the list.

Before 1970, owners of unenclosed land could act more or less charitably towards the public,
allowing them to wander and play there, comforted under their belief that the rule was
where land is unenclosed and uncultivated, the fact that the public has been in the habit of going
upon the land will ordinarily be attributed to a license on the part of the owner, rather than to his
intent to dedicate.... It will not be presumed, from mere failure to object, that the owner of such
land so used intends to create in the public a right which would practically destroy his own right
to use any part of the property.
F. A. Hihn Co. v City of Santa Cruz (1915) 170 C 436, 150 P 62. See also City of Manhattan
Beach v Cortelyou (1938) 10 C2d 653, 76 P2d 483.
But then came Gion v City of Santa Cruz (1970) 2 C3d 29, 84 CR 162, in which the supreme
court held that failing to put a timely stop to that public activity meant that the owners had
impliedly dedicated their land to the public. Their resistance had to be effective, more than just
enough to rebut the inference of a license (2 C3d at 41):
Although “No Trespassing” signs may be sufficient when only an occasional hiker traverses an
isolated property, the same action cannot reasonably be expected to halt a continuous influx of
beach users to an attractive seashore property. If the fee owner proves that he has made more
than minimal and ineffectual efforts to exclude the public, then the trier of fact must decide
whether the owner’s activities have been adequate. If the owner has not attempted to halt public
use in any significant way, however, it will be held as a matter of law that he intended to
dedicate the property or an easement therein to the public, and evidence that the public used the
property for the prescriptive period is sufficient to establish dedication.
In retrospect, could it be said that owners of open land had their right to keep the public out
taken away by the courts because of a rule change regarding licenses? Because of that decision,
local governments did not have to pay compensation for the new public parks and public beaches
that had suddenly been impliedly dedicated to them.
Deeds of Trust and the One-Action Rule
Here is what the supreme court said in Bank of Italy Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v Bentley (1932)
14 P2d 85, about a deed of trust being subject to the one-action rule of CCP §726:
The question presented by these facts is, therefore, whether it is possible to sue on a
promissory note secured by a deed of trust without first exhausting the security or showing that it
is valueless.... An examination of section 726 and of the cases which have construed it leaves no
doubt as to its meaning in this connection.... There is no general reference to “security” as such.
The statute deals with mortgages, and with no other type of security.... It must be considered as
thoroughly settled in California that a deed of trust is not a mortgage. Substantial differences
between the two types of security have been recognized, and statutes applicable to mortgages
have generally been held inapplicable to deeds of trust.... It necessarily follows that the deed of
trust does not come within the terms of section 726, Code of Civil Procedure. Nor do any of the
California cases support a contrary conclusion.... [T]he distinction and its incidents have
survived for so long a period as to render them safe from judicial attack. The remedy for the evils
attending the use of deeds of trust, if there are such, must be legislative.
How, then, should we react to the reasoning of that court when, seven months later, on
rehearing, it opined instead:

It is our opinion that, in the absence of some unusual circumstance not present in this case, an
independent action on a note secured by a deed of trust may not be brought by the holder of the
note unless and until the security is exhausted.... Assuming that a trust deed is not within [CCP
§726] ... we do not feel justified in holding, merely because “title” passes by a deed of trust,
while only a “lien” is created by a mortgage, that, in reference to the necessity of exhausting the
security before enforcing the obligation secured, deeds of trust and mortgages are so different
that in one case security must be exhausted before suit on the personal obligation, while, in the
other, no such necessity exists. Fundamentally, it cannot be doubted that in both situations the
security for an indebtedness is the important and essential thing in the whole transaction. The
economic function of the two instruments would seem to be identical. Where there is one and the
same object to be accomplished, important rights and duties of the parties should not be made to
depend on the more or less accidental form of the security.
Bank of Italy Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v Bentley (1933) 217 C 644, 648, 20 P2d 940.
For over 75 years, California creditors had demanded deeds of trust, rather than mortgages, as
security for their loans because they believed those instruments to be immune from the hazards
of CCP §726. Now, those instruments no longer were safe. (That might sound like a mere
contract rule change, except that the court thought it was more dignified than that; in the first
Bank of Italy opinion, it said (14 P2d at 87): “Any disturbance by this court of these settled rules
of property would cause endless confusion and great hardship.” (Emphasis added.))
Because a secured creditor is allowed to ride through bankruptcy because its security interest
is treated as property that may not be taken from it, did the rule change about the nature of deeds
of trust violating lenders’ Fifth Amendment rights?
Dangers Ahead
If the four-member wing of the United States Supreme Court ever becomes five, we can
certainly look forward to lively times in state court judicial chambers as new rules are debated.
The judges should hope that their malpractice coverage is current and applicable.
Because Florida beachfront property owners could not show an established property right
to littoral property, no unconstitutional taking of property occurred under state and
federal law when local agencies restored eroded beaches for public use.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v Florida Dep’t of Envt’l Protection (2010) _ US_, 177 L Ed
2d 184, 130 S Ct 2592
Under Florida law, the state owns land permanently submerged below navigable waters and
the foreshore, which is “the land between the low-tide line and the mean high-water line.” The
mean-high water line is a line established over the preceding 19 years and varies accordingly.
Private property owners own the beachfront property or littoral property above the mean highwater line. Beachfront property owners are entitled to any addition of property due to gradual,
imperceptible accretions and relictions. “Accretions are additions of alluvion (sand, sediment, or
other deposits) to waterfront land; relictions are lands once covered by water that become dry
when the water recedes.” 177 L Ed 2d at 192. But in the event that land is added by avulsion,
which is a sudden and immediately perceptible change in the coastline, under common law and
Florida state law, that land is owned by the seabed owner (typically the state). Florida has passed
legislation to allow local governments “to deposit sand on eroded beaches (restoration) and to

maintain the deposited sand (nourishment).” At issue in this case was the attempt by a local city
and county to replenish Florida beaches eroded by several hurricanes.
Plaintiffs and appellants are private beachfront owners who formed a nonprofit corporation to
challenge the permit granted to the local city and county to restore and nourish the eroded beach
and to allege an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation.
Beachfront owners first filed an unsuccessful administrative challenge to the permit and then
appealed to the court. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the agency’s grant of a
permit, remanding the case back to the agency and certifying to the Florida Supreme Court the
question of whether there had been an unconstitutional taking of beachfront owners’ littoral
rights. The Florida Supreme Court held that no unconstitutional taking had occurred, quashed the
remand, and denied rehearing. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Beachfront owners alleged an unconstitutional taking without just compensation under the
Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. They alleged that
their right to future accretions and their right to have their beachfront property directly abut the
ocean had been taken from them in violation of the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.
A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court (Justice Stevens not participating) held that, under federal
and state law, no unconstitutional taking without just compensation had occurred. By restoring
and nourishing the eroded beach, the city and county essentially created an avulsion, which then
established a new and permanent “erosion control line” that replaced the fluctuating mean highwater line for purposes of demarcation between littoral and state property. The Court entertained
and dismissed under Florida state law the beachfront owners’ argument that an owner of property
should not be able to create an avulsion, which would benefit its own property interests. Once the
permanent erosion control line is recorded, beachfront owners no longer become entitled to
added land created by accretion or reliction because their land no longer comes in contact with
the water. The right to future accretions and relictions is “subordinate to the State’s right to fill.”
177 L Ed 2d at 207.
As to the owners’ argument that the state took away their rights to have their beachfront
property permanently abut the water, the Court approvingly quoted Florida case law, noting that
“there is no independent right of contact with the water” as long as access to the water is
maintained for the beachfront owners and the public. 177 L Ed 2d at 208. Further, preserving this
right would essentially void the erosion control line and create a permanent, inviolate mean highwater line in contradiction of Florida law.
The Court found that two arguments presented by the city and county were waived because
they were absent from the briefs:
•

While beachfront owners owned private property, the nonprofit corporation pursuing relief did
not.

•

The beachfront owners’ claim was not ripe for decision because they had not made a claim for
just compensation.
Four Justices held that the takings clause applies to judicial action. The takings clause is silent
as to the government actor and respective governmental branches. “It would be absurd to allow a
State to do by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat.” 177 L
Ed 2d at 196. Thus, if “a legislature or a court declares that what was once an established right
of private property no longer exists, it has taken that property” in violation of the takings clause.

177 L Ed 2d at 197 (emphasis in original). The Court rejected a proposed test that future takings
analyses include an additional requirement that the judicial action had no “fair and substantial
basis.” The Court rejected another proposed test that future takings analyses include an
“unpredictability test,” requiring reversal of a judicial taking only if the decision reflects “a
sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of relevant precedents.” 177 L Ed 2d at 205.
Two Justices suggested the viability of a due process clause analysis under the Fourteenth
Amendment—obviating the need for and essentially duplicating the likely results of a judicial
takings analysis. Six Justices declined to address the due process argument because beachfront
owners “did not raise this challenge before the Florida Supreme Court, and only obliquely raised
it in the petition for certiorari.” 177 L Ed 2d at 206 n 11. Nevertheless, two Justices argued that a
due process clause analysis would honor the separation of powers doctrine, keeping the power of
eminent domain safely within the purview of legislative branch.

